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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, 
Section 78-2-2(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and Rules 
3(a) and 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the oral agreement between Earl Grossen and Ogden 
Dewitt fall within the statute of frauds (Section 25-5-1 et 
seq.)? 
2. If so, did the partial performance exception take that 
oral agreement out of the statute of frauds? 
3. If so, did Ogden Dewitt fully perform under the oral 
agreement? 
4. Is Utah Code Section 57-1-31 applicable in this case? 
5. Did the trial court error in releasing the lis pendens? 
6. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this appeal? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. During a bench trial in this matter, after 
counterclaimants had rested their case, the trial court ruled in 
counterclaim defendant's favor and entered findings of fact. 
Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
"after the [counterclaimant] in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence 
1 
the [counterclaim defendant] without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a 
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the 
[counterclaimant] has shown no right to relief." "If the court 
renders judgment on the merits against the [counterclaimant], the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)," (Rule 
42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.) In this case, after the 
counterclaimants rested their case the trial court ruled against 
counterclaimants and entered findings of fact. 
Where the trial court makes findings of fact and enters a 
judgment based thereon, as in this case, the facts are not 
"examined in the light most favorable to the losing party" as 
appellants argue, but the trial court's findings of fact are 
upheld on appeal unless "clearly erroneous." Grayson Roper 
Limited Partnership vs. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470(Utah 1989); 
Mackay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995) (an appellate 
court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court 
sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight 
of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.") 
On appeal, this court should not overturn the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are found to be clearly erroneous. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In June, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt purchased 
property from Earl Grossen, and Earl Grossen took back a note 
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secured by a trust deed on the property for part of the purchase 
price. By September, 1995, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt 
were delinquent in payment of taxes on the property, had not 
obtained insurance on the property, and were delinquent in 
payments under the Trust Deed note. On September 19, 1995, a 
Notice of Default was recorded against the property and mailed to 
the trustors. 
On December 19, 1995, the three month statutory cure period 
under Section 57-1-31 expired. By that time, no back payments 
had been made, no taxes on the property had been paid and no 
insurance on the property had been obtained. Therefore, the 
trustee noticed a trustee's sale for February 29, 1996. 
On January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the brother of Derel K. 
Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, approached Earl Grossen and 
offered to pay the back payments, insure the property and pay the 
unpaid property taxes. Earl Grossen tentatively agreed to cancel 
the trustee's sale and cancel the Notice of Default if Ogden 
Dewitt would do this. 
Within the next two weeks, Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617 in 
back payments due under the Trust Deed note in the form of two 
checks delivered to Mr. Grossen. By February 13, 1996, however, 
the property had not been insured and the real property taxes had 
not been paid. On February 13, 1996, Mr. Grossen advised Ogden 
Dewitt in a telephone conversation that the "deal was off" and 
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the foreclosure sale would go forward. Mr. Grossen never cashed 
the checks. 
This matter was tried before the Honorable Judge Schofield, 
Fourth District Court, on March 20, 1997 and on April 7, 1997. 
The court thereafter entered Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and concluded that the oral agreement between 
Earl Grossen and Ogden Dewitt, even if proven, was unenforceable 
under the statute of frauds. Judge Schofield also ruled that the 
partial performance exception to the statute of frauds did not 
apply. From that ruling, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt 
have taken this appeal. 
FACTS 
1. On June 1, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt 
executed a Trust Deed Note (the "Note") and Trust Deed (the 
"Trust Deed") in favor of Earl Grossen and Mary Ada Grossen (now 
deceased). (R. 314). l 
2. The Note was secured by the Trust Deed, and was 
recorded on June 2, 1993 against certain property in Payson, 
Utah, located at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (the 
"Property"). (R. 314). 
3. On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor 
1Paragraphes 1-14 of the facts set forth herein are the same 
as set forth in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law entered on September 26, 1997, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Appendix A. 
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trustee under the Trust Deed, executed a Notice of Default and 
commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Trust Deed 
pursuant to Section 57-1-19 et seq. The Notice of Default set 
forth three defaults: 1) payment on the Note was delinquent in 
the amount of $1,011.32 as of September 12, 1995, 2) property 
taxes on the property were due and owing, 3) there was no 
insurance on the property. (R. 314). 
4. Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had 
not paid any property taxes on the Property. Property taxes for 
1993, 1994 and 1995 were due and owing in the amount of $432.11, 
$475.74 and $392.86 respectively (which included penalty and 
interest.) (R. 314). 
5. Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had 
never insured the Property. (R. 313). 
6. On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the 
brother of Derel K. Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, contacted 
Earl Grossen, the beneficiary under the Trust Deed by telephone. 
Earl Grossen and Ogden Dewitt reached a tentative2 agreement 
2The Earl Grossen - Ogden Dewitt agreement was only 
tentative: 
Q. Let's talk for a minute about this agreement 
you had with Ogden Dewitt. Was this in your 
mind a tentative agreement or a finalized 
agreement? 
A. (By Earl Grossen) Well, it was tentative in 
my mind. It wasn't locked in cement or 
locked in any kind of a written agreement. 
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regarding the payment of the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated 
was in the amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and 
the Property needed to be insured. (R. 313) 
7. Ogden Dewitt also agreed to immediately bring current 
all unpaid taxes and insure the Property. (R. 313). 
8. Ogden Dewitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two payments, one 
of $1,000 by the following Monday and one of $617.00 paid by the 
end of the next week. (R. 313). 
9. Ogden Dewitt tendered both the $1,000 check and the 
$617.00 check to Earl Grossen as per their tentative agreement, 
but these checks were never cashed. (R. 312). 
10. Neither defendants nor Ogden Dewitt paid any of the 
unpaid property taxes or insured the Property. (R. 312). 
11. On or about February 13, 1997, Ogden Dewitt and Earl 
Grossen spoke on the telephone and Earl Grossen told Ogden Dewitt 
the Meal was off." (R. 312). 
12. On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the Trustee for 
Earl Grossen held a Trustee's Sale at the appointed time and 
(Trial Transcript of Earl Grossen's trial testimony, pg 35, lines 
3-8, R. 467.) 
Q. Okay. So the deal was open then for how many 
days in your mind? 
A. (By Earl Grossen) The tentative agreement — 
verbal agreement was open probably a couple 
of days, three days. Something like that. 
(Trial Transcripts of Earl Grossen's trial testimony, pg 39, 
lines 22-25; pg 40, line 1, R. 471-72.) 
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place and no other bidders being present, bid in the amount then 
due and owing under the Trust Deed Note. A Trustee's Deed was 
then executed by David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying 
the property to Earl Grossen. (R. 312) . 
13. Judgment was filed on May 7, 1997. (R. 311). 
14. Defendants filed their Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend 
Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict on June 3, 
1997. (R. 314). 
15. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered September 26, 1997. (R. 314). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The oral agreement between Ogden Dewitt and Earl Grossen, 
even if proven, was unenforceable under the statute of frauds 
since it concerned real property and was a promise by Ogden 
Dewitt to answer for the debt of another. Furthermore, the 
"partial performance" exception is inapplicable in this case 
since the actions here do not rise to a level necessary to 
satisfy the "partial performance" exception. Section 57-1-31 is 
also inapplicable in this case since the statutory right to cure 
expired on December 19, 1995. 
Within 3 weeks after the checks being tendered, Earl Grossen 
advised Ogden Dewitt that "the deal was off" and the foreclosure 
sale would proceed on February 29, 1996. The checks were never 
cashed. The unpaid property taxes were never paid and the 
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property was never insured. Even if the agreement was 
enforceable, Ogden Dewitt failed to fully perform and is not 
entitled to the benefits thereof. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS REQUIRES THE 
OGDEN DEWITT - EARL GROSSEN AGREEMENT TO BE 
IN WRITING TO BE ENFORCEABLE. 
The statute of frauds requires the Ogden Dewitt - Earl 
Grossen agreement to be in writing to be enforceable because it 
1) creates "power over or concerning real property," and 2) Ogden 
Dewitt is "answering for the debt of another." 
A. The Ogden Dewitt - Earl Grossen Agreement Must Be In 
Writing To Be Enforceable Because It "Creates Power Over or 
Concerning Real Property." 
Utah Code Section 25-5-1 provides that "No estate or 
interest in real property... nor any trust or power over or 
concerning real property or in any manner related thereto, shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared 
otherwise... [except] in writing." 
In this case, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt granted 
Earl Grossen a trust deed (the "Trust Deed") which was recorded 
against their property and granted the trustee under the Trust 
Deed power to sell the property in the event of default. On 
September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor trustee under 
the Trust Deed, recorded a Notice of Default against the property 
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setting forth three grounds for default, 1) payments weren't 
being made under the Trust Deed note, 2) back property taxes were 
unpaid, and 3) the property was uninsured. Three months passed 
and none of these defaults were cured. A trustee's sale was then 
scheduled for February 29, 1996. 
On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, who was Derel K. 
Dewitt's brother and Afton H. Dewitt's son, called Earl Grossen 
on the telephone and the two reached a tentative agreement to 
cancel the trustee's sale and cancel the Notice of Default if 
Ogden Dewitt paid the back payments, paid the back property taxes 
and insured the property. 
Under Section 25-5-1, to be enforceable any agreement to 
cancel a trustee's sale would have to be in writing, since it 
would be an agreement to "surrender" a "power over or concerning 
real property." Any agreement to cancel a Notice of Default 
would also have to be in writing since it would also be an 
agreement to "surrender" a "power over or concerning real 
property." Therefore, the oral agreement between Earl Grossen 
and Ogden Dewitt, even if proven, would have to be in writing 
pursuant to Section 25-5-1 to be enforceable. 
Furthermore, if an agreement has to be m writing pursuant 
to Section 25-5-1, so does any alteration or modification 
thereof. "The rule is well settled in Utah that if the original 
agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement 
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that modifies any of the material parts of the original must also 
satisfy the statute." Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 
1996). "An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be 
in writing if the contract that is extinguished falls within the 
Statute of Frauds." SCM Land Co. vs. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 
105, 108 (Utah 1986). "It is elementary that when a contract is 
required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with 
equal force to any alteration or modification thereof." Zion' s 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). See 
also Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 267 P. 1020, 1032 (Utah 
1928). In this case, because the Trust Deed and the Notice of 
Default had to be in writing, so did any agreement canceling the 
Notice of Default or altering or amending the trustee's power of 
sale under the Trust Deed. 
B. The Ogden Dewitt - Earl Grossen Agreement Must Be In 
Writing To Be Enforceable Because Ogden Dewitt Is "Answering For 
the Debt of Another." 
Utah Code Section 25-5-4(2) provides that "every promise to 
answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another" is void 
unless "in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement." In this case, Ogden Dewitt agreed to answer for the 
"debt of another," to wit, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt's 
debt to Earl Grossen under the Trust Deed note. Ogden Dewitt was 
not a trustor under the Trust Deed or a signator on the Trust 
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Deed note and had no obligation thereunder. Therefore, under 
that section of the statute of frauds, the promise of Ogden 
Dewitt to answer for the debt of Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. 
Dewitt was also void since it was a promise to "'answer for the 
debt of another" that was not in writing. 
II. THE PART PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION 
DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
The part performance exception to statute of frauds does not 
apply in this case because 1) the part performance exception only 
applies in specific performance actions, 2) the part performance 
in this case was insufficient, and 3) the trial court's findings 
of fact on this issue will not be overturned on appeal unless 
"clearly erroneous." 
A. The Part Performance Exception Only Applies in Specific 
Performance Actions. 
Utah Code Section 25-5-8 provides that "Nothing in this 
chapter [the statute of frauds] ... shall be construed to abridge 
the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of 
agreements in case of part performance." This is not a case of 
specific performance, therefore the part performance exception is 
not available. See McKinnon vs. Corporation of President of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1974); Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959) 
(specific performance); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 
710 (Utah 1977) (specific performance). 
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B. The Part Performance In This Case Was Insufficient, 
Even where an oral agreement falls within the statute of 
frauds, the court may nevertheless enforce the oral agreement if 
there is sufficient part performance to "estop" the promisor from 
denying the agreement. Under that exception, the level of 
performance by the performing party must be so great that to fail 
to enforce the agreement would constitute a "fraud" on the 
performing party. See, e.g., Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust 
Company, 305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956) ("Failure to perform on 
the part of the promisor would result in fraud on the performer 
who relied"); In re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595 (Utah 1953) 
("Part performance which will avoid statute of frauds may consist 
of any act which puts party performing in such position that 
nonperformance by other would constitute fraud"); Utah Mercur 
Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Min. Co., 134 P.2d 1094, 1096 
(Utah 1943) ("Part performance which will avoid statute of frauds 
may consist of any act which puts party performing in such 
position that nonperformance by other would constitute fraud.") 
The part performance exception to the statute of frauds only 
applies in cases where there has been substantial part 
performance over a significant period of time. See e.g., 
Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959) (the part 
performance spanned several years and included both payments and 
permanent improvements to the property); Carnesecca v. 
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Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977) (the part performance 
consisted of taking possession of the land, redeeming it from tax 
sale, and expending considerable sums to improve it, including 
planting, installing heating and irrigation systems and placing a 
well thereon); Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975) (12 
years of performance under an oral contract). 
In cases where performance is not substantial, the part 
performance exception does not apply. See, e.g., McKmnon vs. 
Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 52 9 
P.2d 434, 435 (Utah 1974) (delivery of two $7,000 checks, which 
were not cashed, is not sufficient part performance); Moffat v. 
Hoffman, 214 P. 308 (Utah 1923) ($350 improvements and 10 months 
living m property not sufficient part performance.) 
In this case, Ogden Dewitt tendered 2 checks in the amount 
of $1,617. Those checks were not cashed and within 3 weeks Ogden 
Dewitt was informed that the "deal was off." The property taxes 
were never paid and the property was never insured. Ogden Dewitt 
had lost nothing because the checks were never cashed. 
Furthermore, Ogden Dewitt had no interest in the property. The 
trial court's finding of fact that these actions were 
insufficient to establish the partial performance exception to 
the statute of frauds should be upheld. 
C. The Trial Court's Finding of Fact that Derel K. Dewitt 
and Afton H. Dewitt Failed to Meet Their Burden of Proving Part 
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Performance or Estoppel Should Not Be Overturned. 
Even after Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt briefed this 
issue to the trial court and requested that the trial court 
reconsider its ruling, the trial court declined: 
I decline to reconsider the applicability of 
the doctrines of part performance and 
estoppel as they relate to the statute of 
frauds in this case. On the merits of the 
case and where each party was adequately 
represented at trial, I feel no compunction 
to reconsider the findings or the ruling, 
even with the benefit of the parties' new 
briefs. 
(Ruling, September 15, 1997, page 2, Judge Anthony W. Schofield, 
R. 307, a copy thereof is attached hereto as Appendix B.) 
Since the issue of part performance and estoppel are factual 
issues, the trial court's finding of fact that Derel K. Dewitt 
and Afton H. Dewitt failed to meet their burden of proof should 
not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. See, e.g., 
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership vs. Finlmson, 782 P.2d 467, 
470 (Utah 1989). 
In this case, Ogden Dewitt, a person with no legal interest 
in the property, tendered two checks in the amount of $1,617. 
These checks were not cashed and within three weeks Ogden Dewitt 
was informed that the "deal was off." Ogden Dewitt lost nothing 
because the checks were never cashed. Ogden Dewitt was informed 
that the "deal was off" 16 days before the trustee's sale. The 
property taxes were never paid and the property was never 
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insured. The trial court's finding that there were insufficient 
facts to establish part performance or estoppel should be upheld. 
D. The Cases Cited by Defendants are Inapposite. 
The cases cited by Appellants do not support their claim 
that the partial performance exception applies in this case. In 
Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 1959), performance 
spanned several years and included permanent improvements to the 
property as well as payments. In this case, although Mr. Grossen 
had two checks in his possession, he never cashed them. When 
back taxes were not paid and insurance was not purchased, Mr. 
Grossen advised Ogden Dewitt that the sale would proceed. If 
there is uncertainty as to whether complete performance was to 
take place before the trustee's sale was canceled, the court must 
find that the terms of the contract were too uncertain to take 
the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds and to allow 
specific performance. See Id. 
Appellants next rely on Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 
(Utah 1968). Appellants fail to mention that the language they 
quote in that case comes from the dissent's opinion. Furthermore, 
unlike Evershed, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt did not rely 
on Earl Grossen's representations to their detriment. Two checks 
were delivered by Ogden Dewitt, but never cashed. Defendants 
were in no worse position than they originally were. They had 
not lost any money. Ogden Dewitt had no ownership interest in 
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the property. He was advised that the "deal was off" on February 
13, 1996, 16 days before the trustee's sale. In short, 
appellants' reliance on Evershed is misplaced. 
In Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977), 
the court ruled that the statute of frauds did not apply since 
there was sufficient partial performance. The specific acts of 
part performance in that case were as follows: 
Joe has been in possession of the land, redeemed it 
from tax sale, expended considerable sums to improve 
it, (planting, installing heating and irrigation 
systems and placing a well thereon) all of which is 
substantial evidence of a fully executed oral contract 
of purchase. 
Id. at 711. 
Those acts go far beyond the two uncashed checks that were 
delivered by Dewitt. The second reason why the court found the 
statute of frauds did not apply is because "trusts arising by 
implication or operation of law are expressly excluded from the 
effects of the statute." Id. Again, this is not the case here. 
Appellants argue that they have given up a substantial legal 
right, and therefore their situation is parallel to the situation 
in Carnesecca. Appellants Brief at 20. Appellants fail to 
explain, however, what ''substantial legal right" they have given 
up. Once again, Carnesecca is much different than this case. 
Appellants also incorrectly cite Romrell v. Zions First 
National Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). The portion of Romrell 
quoted by appellants is nothing more than a summary of one of the 
jury instructions used at the trial level. The court did not 
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need to decide the validity of the instruction since this was a 
case in equity and XN[w]hen a jury is used in an equity case, it 
acts in an advisory capacity." 611 P.2d 392, 394. The court 
further stated that XN[t]he general verdict does not indicate the 
factual basis for finding an enforceable oral contract, and it 
clearly is not for this Court to undertake a canvass of the 
record for the purpose, in effect, of making its own findings." 
Id. at 395. The appellate court upheld the lower court's 
decision not because the jury instruction was correct, but 
because regardless of whether it was correct, the judge had the 
discretion to weigh the evidence and make the final decision. 
A law review article is also cited by appellants. Appellants 
claim the article states that M>[a]n admission by the defendant 
is, of course, the best parol proof of the existence of an oral 
agreement which could then be enforced." Appellants' Brief at 
21. The cited quote, however, refers to the terms of an oral 
agreement, not to the actual existence of an oral agreement. See 
The Doctrine of Part Performance as Applied to Oral Land 
Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 106 (1964). Furthermore, this 
article is written by a student, which bears even less persuasion 
than other authorities. 
The case of Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P. 218 (Utah 1893) is 
also not cited correctly. Appellants quote the following 
language: "Crucially significant [to the estoppel analysis] was 
the fact that the existence of the contract had been admitted as 
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true." Appellants' Brief at 22. Not only did appellants cite to 
the wrong reporter, the quoted language is not to be found in the 
entire opinion. See Brinton v. Van Cott, 33 P.218 (Utah 1893). 
It :s true that the court mentioned that "[t]he facts pleaded in 
this case are admitted as true," but this is because the case was 
on appeal from a sustained demurrer. Ld. at 220. The court did 
uphold this contract, but in doing so, made it clear that 
"[p]ayment of the consideration will not, in general, be deemed 
such a part performance as to relieve a parol contract from the 
operation of the statute [of frauds]." Ld. As long as "the 
repayment of the consideration will place the parties in the same 
situation in which they were before," the court will not 
specifically enforce an oral contract. Id. The primary reason 
that the court upheld the oral contract in that case was because 
"the services to be rendered were of such a peculiar character 
that it [would be] impossible to estimate their value to the 
plaintiff by any pecuniary standard." Id. Furthermore, the 
party seeking enforcement of the contract had fully performed her 
part of the contract. The court relied on full performance of the 
contract and the possibility of compensating for damages, rather 
than admission of a contract as the appellants have argued. 
Appellants also rely on Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516 
P.2d 178 (Utah 1973). They argue that the "Utah Supreme Court 
indicated that a party could waive the right to foreclosure by 
telling a mortgagor that, xNo action would be forthcoming if 
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defendant paid the aggregate of the payments due.'" Appellants' 
Brief at 22 (quoting Bowery Savings Bank v. Jenkins, 516 P.2d 178 
(Utah 1973). The Utah Supreme Court ruled, however, that this 
was an issue to be decided at trial, not on summary judgment, and 
that is why the case was remanded. In the present case, 
appellants have tried their case. The trial court ruled that 
accepting, but not cashing, 2 checks for three weeks paid by one 
with no interest in the property is not sufficient partial 
performance, especially where insurance was not obtained and back 
taxes were not paid as agreed. 
The final case that appellants rely on is Woolsey v. Brown, 
539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975). Once again, the facts in that case 
are distinguishable. The court said, "[ejquity will not permit a 
party to accept performance for many years and then claim terms 
contrary to the evidence." Id. at 1039. In that case, 
plaintiffs performed "for 12 years under an oral agreement for 
the sale of real property." _Id. at 1038. Once again, the acts of 
partial performance in the cited case go far beyond the two 
uncashed checks in this case. The cases cited in appellants' 
brief show a great deal more partial performance than has taken 
place in the present action. 
III. OGDEN DEWITT FAILED TO FULLY 
PERFORM UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
In exchange for Earl Grossen canceling the trustee's sale 
and canceling the Notice of Default, Ogden Dewitt also agreed to 
immediately bring current any and all taxes and insure the 
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property. (See Facts, paragraph 7). By February 13, 1996, 
although Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617, the taxes had not been 
paid and the property not insured. On February 13, 1996, Earl 
Grossen told Ogden Dewitt the "deal was off." The back taxes and 
property insurance were never paid by Ogden Dewitt, Derel Dewitt 
or Afton Dewitt. Because Ogden Dewitt failed to fully perform 
under the terms of the agreement, he was not entitled to the 
benefits of the agreement, to_ wit, canceling the Notice of 
Default and canceling the trustee's sale. 
To be enforceable, the terms of the oral contract must be 
"clear and definite." Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Company, 
305 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1956) The Dewitts must prove a "certain 
definite and unambiguous contract." Hargreaves vs. Burton, 206 P. 
262, 264 (Utah 1922). The oral contract and the terms thereof 
must be proven by "clear and definite evidence." Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Company, 305 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah 1956); 
Christensen v. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101, 102 (Utah 1959) 
(plaintiff "must show a clear mutual understanding and a positive 
agreement of both parties to the terms of the contract.") The 
contract terms must be fully performed by the party seeking 
enforcement of a clear and definite oral contract. Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 305 P.2d 480 (1956). In this case, the 
oral contract, even if proven, was never fully performed by Ogden 
Dewitt and therefore Ogden Dewitt was not entitled to the 
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benefits thereof.3 
IV, SECTION 57-1-31 IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
Section 57-1-31 is inapplicable in this case because 1) 
payment was tendered more than three months after the Notice of 
Default was filed, 2) the payment tendered did not cure the 
entire default under the Trust Deed, and 3) Ogden Dewitt did not 
have standing to cure the default under the Trust Deed. 
A. Payment Was Tendered After the Three Month Cure Period 
Had Passed. 
Because the $1,617 payment was tendered more than 3 months 
after the Notice of Default was filed, there was no statutory 
right to cure under Section 57-1-31(1). Section 57-1-31(1) 
provides the trustor under a Trust Deed with a statutory right to 
cure any default within 3 months after a Notice of Default is 
filed by curing the default and paying costs and attorney's fees: 
[The trustor,] at any time within three 
months of the filing for record of notice of 
default under such trust deed, if the power 
of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the 
beneficiary or his successor in interest the 
entire amount then due under the terms of 
such trust deed (including costs and expenses 
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of 
such obligation, or trust deed, and the 
trustee's and attorney's fees actually 
incurred) ... and thereby cure the default 
theretofore existing and, thereupon, all 
3If there is uncertainty as to whether complete performance 
was to take place before the trustee's sale was to be canceled, 
then the court must find that the terms of the agreement were too 
uncertain to take the oral agreement out of the statute of 
frauds. See, Christensen vs. Christensen, 339 P.2d 101 (Utah 
1959). 
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proceedings theretofore had or instituted 
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the 
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated 
and shall be and remain in force and effect 
the same as if no such acceleration had 
occurred. 
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-31(1). 
In this case, the Notice of Default was filed on September 
19, 1995. Ogden Dewitt tendered the $1,617 payment after January 
25, 1996, which was well after the 3 month statutory right to 
cure had lapsed on December 19, 1995. After that 3 month period 
had lapsed, the trustors now had to pay the entire amount due 
under the trust deed (approximately $35,000). Section 57-1-31(1) 
is inapplicable in this case because Ogden Dewitt's tender was 
untimely. 
B. The Payment Tendered Did Not Cure the Default Under the 
Trust Deed. 
Ogden Dewitt tendered $1,617 to Earl Grossen m the form of 
two checks. This did not cure the entire default specified in the 
Notice of Default because Ogden Dewitt did not pay the unpaid 
property taxes or insure the Property. This also did not 
reimburse Earl Grossen his costs and attorney's fees. Therefore, 
even if the tender had been timely, it did not constitute a cure 
within the meaning of Section 57-1-31(2) because it did not cure 
the entire default and did not include statutorily required 
reimbursement of costs and attorney's fees. 
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C. Ogden Dewitt Had No Standing to Cure Under Section 57-
1-31. 
Finally, only a "trustor or his successor in interest" has a 
right to cure under Section 57-1-31: 
[T]he trustor or his successor in interest in 
the trust property or any part thereof or any 
other person having a subordinate lien or 
encumbrance of record thereon or any 
beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed... 
Utah Code Annotated, §57-1-31(1). 
Because Ogden Dewitt was not the "trustor or his successor in 
interest," he had no statutory right to cure. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR 
IN RELEASING THE LIS PENDENS. 
Defendants cite Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 
590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) as justification for asking the court 
to reinstate the lis pendens on Grossen's property. Hidden 
Meadows involved an action in equity seeking specific performance 
of an option to purchase property. Defendants cite the language 
that, "...the [Supreme] Court has already recognized the full 
effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal." Hidden Meadows, 
1248. However, defendants fail to note that the lis pendens had 
not been released after the first trial in the lower court. 
Indeed, as the Supreme Court later said in Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 
P. 2d 1381, 1393 (1996), "In Hidden Meadows... this court held that 
an unreleased lis pendens remains in effect pending appeal." The 
Utah Supreme Court never said a released lis pendens remains in 
effect pending appeal. The Utah Supreme Court never intended to 
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tie the hands of district court judges in order to prevent the 
release of a lis pendens incidental to litigation just in case 
there might be an appeal. Such a procedure would destroy 
finality in the lower courts and would unnecessarily burden the 
alienation of property. The proper course is for the non-
prevailmg party to obtain a stay pending appeal either from the 
court or by filing a supersedeas bond. 
VI. THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
IN THIS MATTER. 
The original judgment m this matter was filed on May 7, 
1997. On June 3, 1997, appellants filed their Rule 52(b) Motion 
to Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict. One of the basis 
for denying that motion was that the motion was not filed within 
10 days, as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
[Defendants' motion is untimely. Apparently 
counsel for defendants thought he had 30 days 
to file his Rule 52 (b) motion when m fact 
only 10 are allowed. The rule states, "Upon 
motion of a party made no later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court may amend 
its findings or make additional findings and 
may amend the judgment accordingly." Rule 
52(b) URCP. The Rule does allow for a motion 
to amend a judgment to be filed at the same 
time as a motion for a new trial (Rule 59), 
but Rule 59(e) provides, "A motion to alter 
or amend the judgment shall be served not 
later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment." The judgment was filed on May 7, 
1997. The defendants filed their motion to 
amend the findings and judgment on June 3, 
1997. The motion is untimely and therefore 
must be denied. 
(Ruling, September 15, 1997, pgs 1-2, Judge Anthony W. Schofield, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix B.) 
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Because that post-judgment motion was not timely filed, it did 
not toll the appeal period and the Notice of Appeal was not filed 
within 30 days of May 7, 1997. Therefore, the Notice of Appeal 
was not timely filed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should 
be affirmative in its entirety. 
DATED this / y? day of October, 1998 
lusselS*<A. wnne 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
and Appellee 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EARL L. GROSSEN# : AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT 
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff and : 
Counterclaim Defendant, : 
: CIVIL NO. 960400326 
vs. : 
DEREL K. DEWITT and AFTON H. : 
DEWITT, : 
Defendants and : 
Counterclaimants. : 
This matter having been tried before the Court on March 20, 
1997 and again on April 7, 1997, plaintiff and counterclaim 
defendant, Earl Grossen being represented by Russell A. Cline and 
defendants and Counterclaimcints Afton H. Dewitt and Derel K. Dewitt 
being represented by Gordon Duval and Shawn Gouzman, and defendants 
thereafter having filed a Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and 
Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict, and the Court having 
heard all the evidence in this matter and good cause appearing, 
t997SEl\23 Pi! 
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finds, concludes and orders as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On June 1, 1993, Derel K. Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt 
executed a Trust Deed Note (the "Note") and Trust Deed (the "Trust 
Deed") in favor of Earl Grossen and Mary Ada Grossen (now 
deceased). 
2. The Note was secured by the Trust Deed, and was recorded 
on June 2, 1993 against certain property in Payson, Utah, located 
at 30 North 100 West, Payson, Utah (the "Property"). 
3. On September 19, 1995, David Crabtree, as successor 
trustee under the Trust Deed, executed a Notice of Default and 
commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on the Trust Deed 
pursuant to Section 57-1-19 et seq. The Notice of Default set forth 
three defaults: 1) payment on the Note was delinquent in the 
amount of $1,011.32 as of September 12, 1995, 2) property taxes on 
the property were due and owing, 3) there was no adequate fire 
insurance on the property. 
4. Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had 
not paid any property taxes on the Property. Property taxes for 
1993, 1994 and 1995 were due and owing in the amount of $432.11, 
$475.74 and $392.86 respectively (which included penalty and 
interest.) 
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5. Since executing the Note and Trust Deed, defendants had 
never insured the Property. 
6. On or about January 25, 1996, Ogden Dewitt, the brother 
of Derel K. Dewitt and son of Afton H. Dewitt, contacted Earl 
Grossen, the beneficiary under the Trust Deed by telephone. Earl 
Grossen and Ogden Dewitt reached a tentative agreement regarding 
the payment of the arrearage which Earl Grossen stated was in the 
amount of $1,617 and that taxes needed to be paid and the Property 
needed to be insured. 
7. Ogden Dewitt also agreed to immediately bring current all 
unpaid taxes and insure the Property. 
8. Ogden Dewitt agreed to pay $1,617 in two payments, one of 
$1,000 by the following Monday and one of $617.00 paid by the end 
of the next week. 
9. After the January 25, 1996 telephone conversation, Earl 
Grossen came to believe that defendants had violated the terms of 
the Note and Trust Deed by quit claiming the Property and 
encumbering the Property contrary to the terms of the Trust Deed 
Note without his consent. 
10. The Trust Deed Note provided that "The trustors shall not 
sell or encumber the property without the Beneficiaries permission, 
which shall not be unreasonably withheld." 
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11. On April 21, 1994, defendants encumbered the Property 
with a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents in favor of Transamerica 
Financial Services. 
12. On October 25, 1995, defendant Afton H. Dewitt quit-
claimed her interest to Derel K. Dewitt. 
13. Earl Grossen believed these were done without his consent 
and that defendants were not bargaining in good faith, and did not 
finalize the agreement. 
14. Ogden Dewitt tendered both the $1#000 check and the 
$617.00 check to Earl Grossen as per their tentative agreement, but 
these checks were never cashed. 
15. Neither defendants nor Ogden Dewitt paid any of the 
unpaid property taxes or insured the Property. 
16. On or about February 13, 1997, Ogden Dewitt and Earl 
Grossen spoke on the telephone and Earl Grossen told Ogden Dewitt 
the Meal was off." 
17. On February 29, 1996, at 10:00 a.m., the Trustee for Earl 
Grossen held a Trustee's Sale at the appointed time and place and, 
no other bidders being present, bid in the amount then due and 
owing under the Trust Deed Note. A Trustee's Deed was then 
executed by David Crabtree, as successor trustee, conveying the 
property to Earl Grossen. 
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18. Judgment was filed on May 7, 1997. 
19. Defendants filed their Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend 
Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict on June 3, 
1997. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Earl Grossen7s motion for a directed verdict is granted 
on the grounds that any oral agreement between Earl Grossen and 
Ogden Dewitt, even if proved, is unenforceable under the Statute of 
Frauds and the Counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Defendants' Motion to join Derek Shayne Dewitt as a 
necessary party is denied. 
3. The Lis Pendens recorded against the Property by Derek K. 
Dewitt and Afton H. Dewitt is hereby released. 
4. Any issue as to attorney's fees were reserved at trial 
and any claim for attorney's fees may be filed hereafter. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded $270 in rent for March 1, 1997 
through March 27, 1997, and treble rent pursuant to the Utah 
Unlawful Detainer Statute for March 28, 1997 through June 28, 1997 
for $2,700 for judgment against Afton H. Dewitt and Derel K. Dewitt 
in the total amount of $2,970 to bear interest at the prejudgment 
rate of 10% from June 28, 1996 through the date hereof and 
thereafter at the statutory post-judgment rate of interest. 
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6. Plaintiff's claim for damages to the property is denied 
on the grounds that plaintiff has failure to carry his burden of 
proof that the damages were cause by defendants. 
7. Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact 
and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict is untimely under Rule 
52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is therefore denied. 
8. Even if the motion were timely, the Court declines to 
reconsider its previous ruling on the merits except with respect to 
the issue of whether to reinstate the lis pendens. 
9* A released lis pendens does not remain in effect during 
appeal. A district court is not required to allow a lis pendens to 
remain on property just in case there may be an appeal. 
10. The Dewitt's motion to reinstate the lis pendens on the 
rty is denied. 
Dated this ^ day of September, 1997. 
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CARMA B.SMITH, Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EARL L. GROSSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEREL K. DEWITT and AFTON H. 
DEWITT, 
Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
EARL L. GROSSEN, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER. 960400326 
DATED: SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case comes before the court on defendants* Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend 
Findings and Amend Ruling Granting a Directed Verdict. Defendants request that the 
court reconsider its ruling asserting that the court did not have the benefit of briefing 
on applicable Utah case law. This ruling concerns the statute of frauds, the doctrines 
of part performance and estoppel, and the release of a lis pendens. 
First, defendants' motion is untimely. Apparently counsel for defendants 
thought he had 30 days to file his Rule 52(b) motion when in fact only 10 are 
allowed. The rule states, "Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and 
may amend the judgment accordingly." Rule 52(b) URCP. The Rule does allow for a 
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motion to amend a judgment to be filed at the same time as a motion for a new trial 
(Rule 59), but Rule 59(e) provides, "A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." The judgment was filed on 
May 7, 1997. The defendants filed their motion to amend the findings and judgment 
on June 3, 1997. The motion is untimely and therefore must be denied. 
Second, even if the motion is timely, I decline to reconsider the applicability of 
the doctrines of part performance and estoppel as they relate to the statute of frauds in 
this case. On the merits of the case and where each party was adequately represented 
at trial, I feel no compunction to reconsider the findings or the ruling, even with the 
benefit of the parties' new briefs. I do, however, wish to clarify my ruling on the 
release of the lis pendens. 
My job is to rule with finality. I cannot base my rulings on the assumption 
that one or more parties will appeal and yet rule with finality. I address the release of 
the lis pendens in this light. 
Defendants cite Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills. 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979) as justification for asking the court to reinstate the lis pendens on 
Grossen's property. Hidden Meadows involved an action in equity seeking specific 
performance of an option to purchase property. Defendants cite the language that, " 
the [Supreme] Court has already recognized the full effectiveness of lis pendens 
pending appeal." Hidden Meadows, 1247. However defendants fail to note that the 
lis pendens had not been released after the first trial in the lower court. Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court later said in Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d. 1381, 1393 (1986), "In 
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Hidden Meadows . . . this court held that an unreleased lis pendens remains in effect 
pending appeal" (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court never said a released lis 
pendens remains in effect pending appeal. I do not believe the Utah Supreme Court 
intended to tie the hands of district court judges in order to prevent the release of a lis 
pendens incidental to litigation just in case there might be an appeal. Such a 
procedure would destroy finality in the lower courts and would unnecessarily burden 
the alienation of property. The proper course is for the non-prevailing party to obtain 
a stay pending appeal either from the court or by filing a supersedeas bond. 
I decline to reinstate the lis pendens on Grossen's property. 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Grossen's 
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this _^_ day of September, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
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